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People v. Kevorkian: Michigan's Supreme
Court Leads the Way in Declaring No
Fundamental Right to Assist Another in
Suicide

In People v. Kevorkian,' the Michigan Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of Michigan's statute, 1992 Public Act 270,2 which
imposed criminal penalties on a person who assists another in suicide?
After the enactment of the statute, Dr. Jack Kevorkian allegedly assisted
a terminally ill person in committing suicide.' Charges were filed
against Dr. Kevorkian in the Circuit Court of Wayne County alleging
that Dr. Kevorkian violated the assisted suicide statute.' Dr. Kevorkian
moved to dismiss the charges In finding that the statute violated the
United States Constitution, the circuit court held that a person has a
due process right to commit suicide, and the assisted suicide statute
unduly burdens that right.7 The prosecution appealed." Another action
was brought in the Circuit Court of Wayne County after the enactment
of the Michigan statute; Teresa Hobbins, a terminally ill person, and a
group of other plaintiffs, sought a declaration that the assisted suicide
statute was unconstitutional.9 The circuit court found a due process
right to commit suicide, but did not make a determination as to whether
the statute places an undue burden on the right to commit suicide.' 0
The court invalidated the statute by holding that it violated the
Michigan Constitution." The attorney general filed an appeal. 2 On

1.
2.
3.
4.

527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994) (mem.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1795 (1995).
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 752.1027 (Supp. 1996).
Id.
527 N.W.2d at 717.

5. People v. Kevorkian, No. 93-11482, 1993 WL 603212, at *1(Mich. Cir. Ct. Dec. 13,
1993).
6. Id.
7. Id. at *19,
8. Hobbins v. Attorney General, 518 N.W.2d 487, 489 (Mich. App. 1994).

9. Id. at 489.
10. Id.
11. Id.
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appeal, the case of Hobbins was consolidated with the Kevorkian
appeal. 13 The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the assisted suicide
statute violated the Michigan Constitution and was, therefore, unenforceable. 14 The court also found that there is no constitutional right
to commit suicide, and held that a state may make assisted suicide a
criminal offense.' 5 The prosecuting authorities filed an appeal contending that the assisted suicide statute does not violate the Michigan
Constitution, and Dr. Kevorkian filed an appeal alleging that the statute
violates the United States Constitution.' 6 The Michigan Supreme
Court held that the assisted suicide statute does not violate the
Michigan Constitution 7 and that the United States Constitution does
not prohibit a state from imposing criminal penalties on one who assists
another in suicide. 8
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution declares, "nor shall any State deprive a person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of the law."'" The United
States Supreme Court has found a right of personal privacy implied in
this amendment.2 ° Union Pacific Railway v. Botsford2 was one of the
earliest cases suggesting an implied right of privacy.22 In Union, the
Supreme Court stated, "[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more
carefully guarded by the common law, than the right of every individual
to the possession and control of his own person."23 In Roe v. Wade,24
the Court reinforced the right of personal privacy.2
In Roe, the
plaintiffs brought a declaratory action challenging the constitutionality
of a Texas statute that proscribed all abortions except those performed

to save the mother's life.28 The Supreme Court found the statute was
unconstitutional and held the following: 1) Prior to the end of the first
trimester the decision to abort rests solely on the woman and her
attending physician; 2) Subsequent to the first trimester, the state may

12. Id.
13.

Id.
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20.
21.
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23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at 492.
Id. at 494.
527 N.W.2d at 718.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 733.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
141 U.S. 250 (1891).
Id. at 251.
Id.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 153.
Id. at 113.
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regulate abortions in a manner reasonably related to maternal health;
and 3) Once the fetus has reached viability, the state may regulate and
even proscribe abortions, except in instances where the abortion is
necessary to save the mother's life." The Court held that the Texas
statute was unconstitutional because it violated women's right of
personal privacy.28 The Court recognized that this long-standing right
is founded in the Fourteenth Amendment.29 The right of privacy is
limited to personal rights that can be deemed fundamental.3 ' A right
is fundamental if it is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty or deeply
rooted in history and traditions.3 ' The Court further stated that in
determining a statute's constitutionality where a fundamental right is
established, the state's interest must be weighed against the interest of
the person seeking the right of privacy.32 In Roe, the Court found that
a woman's personal right of privacy in the first trimester is stronger
than the interest of the state in proscribing abortions. 3 The Court
then analyzed both the mother's and state's interest at different stages
of the pregnancy to determine the constitutionality of state abortion
regulations. 4 The Supreme Court, in Carey v. Population Services
International,3 5 analyzed a statute regulating the sale of nonprescriptive contraceptives.3 6 The statute only allowed licensed pharmacists to
sell nonprescriptive contraceptives to persons over the age of sixteen. 7
Finding the statute violated the privacy right protected by the Constitution, 8 the Court noted that the right of personal privacy includes the
interest in making certain kinds of personal decisions free from state
interference.3 9 The Court recognized that limitations have not been
established in determining specific areas covered by the right of personal
privacy.40 The Court, however, referenced past decisions that identified
areas subject to the right of personal privacy.4 The Court stated a
person's right to privacy encompasses personal decisions relating to

27. Id. at 164.

28. Id.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 153.
Id.at 152.
Id. (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
Id. at 154.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 163-64.
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
Id. at 678.
Id.
Id.at 697.
Id. at 684.

40. Id.
41. Id. at 685.
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marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child
rearing and education.42 The Court's dicta explained that the right of
privacy deals with the most intimate of human activities and relationships.43 In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,4 the Supreme Court was
confronted with determining the constitutionality of two amendments to
a Pennsylvania abortion statute.45 The statute's amendments provided
that a woman seeking an abortion must be given information concerning
the abortion at least twenty-four hours prior to the operation and must
give her informed consent to the procedure; a married woman must sign
a statement declaring that she has notified her husband, except in
certain situations; and a minor must have parental consent or proceed
through a judicial bypass.46 The Court held unconstitutional the
provision stating that a married woman must sign a statement declaring
that she has notified her husband.47 The Court found that the right of
a pregnant woman to terminate her pregnancy was fundamental, and
that the Pennsylvania statute placed an undue burden on this right.4 8
In Casey, the Court summarized the interests protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment stating, "matters, involving the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define
one's own concept of existence."4 9 This holding emphasized the right
of bodily integrity.50 The right of bodily integrity is most pervasive in
the right to die cases. In Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of
Health,"' the Court expanded the right of bodily integrity. In Cruzan,.
the guardians of a patient brought a declaratory judgment action
seeking the right to terminate artificial hydration and nutrition of the
patient.5 2 The patient had sustained severe injuries in an automobile
accident, and she remained in a persistent vegetative state. 3 The
termination of the artificial hydration and nutrition would result in the
death of the patient. 4 Referring to a prior New Jersey Supreme Court

42.

Id.

43. Id.
44. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
45.

Id. at 844.

46. Id.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 895.
Id.
Id. at 851.
Id. at 849.
497 U.S. 261 (1990).
Id. at 268.
Id. at 266.
Id. at 268.
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holding in In re Quinlan," the Court stated that a competent person
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical care.56 The Court further held that in the case of an incompetent person, a surrogate decisionmaker may have the right to refuse
medical care for that incompetent person if it can be shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the incompetent person would have made the
same decision. 7 Finding the right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment in the Due Process Clause,58 the Court concluded that even
when a liberty interest is found, it must undergo a balancing test. 9
Therefore, a state statute in conflict with a liberty interest may still be
constitutional if the state's interest is greater than the liberty interest.60
In People v. Kevorkian,6 ' the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Michigan's assisted suicide statute 2 which imposes
criminal penalties on one who assists another in suicide." The court
found that three requirements must be met to declare the statute
unconstitutional.' First, there must be a fundamental right to commit
suicide.65 Second, there must also be a fundamental right to assistance
in committing suicide.66 Third, the interest of those seeking the right
of assisted suicide must outweigh the interest of the state in proscribing
assisted suicide.6 7 The proponents of assisted suicide base their
contention that a fundamental right to assisted suicide exists on many
theories, at least with respect to the terminally ill.65 One theory relies
on the holdings in Roe and Casey.69 The proponents of assisted suicide
argue that these cases develop liberty interests concerning a person's
right to personal autonomy, They further contend that the right to
assisted suicide is covered by this realm of personal autonomy just as
marriage, procreation, family relationships, and education are covered

55.

355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

497 U.S. at 270.
Id.
Id. at 278.
Id. at 279.
Id.
527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994).
Id. at 733.
MICH. COMP. LAWs § 752.1027 (Supp. 1996).
527 N.W.2d at 724-25.
Id. at 724.
Id.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 724-25.
Id. at 725.
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because all of these areas deal with subjects that are very personal by
their nature. 7' Finally, the proponents focus on a section of the opinion
in Casey that states, "there is a realm of personal liberty which the
government may not enter."7" Another theory that the proponents of
assisted suicide advance is that assisted suicide is analogous to
terminating life-sustaining treatment or refusing unwanted medical
care. 73 The proponents claim that these subjects are similar because
they all result in death.7 4 In analyzing the constitutionality of the
assisted suicide statute, the Michigan Supreme Court began and ended
its inquiry with the issue of whether there is a fundamental right to
commit suicide.75 The court found that there is no such right.76 In
reaching this conclusion, the court began its analysis by distinguishing
both the termination of life-sustaining treatment and the refusal of
unwanted medical care from suicide.77 The court found a substantial
distinction in the fact that suicide deals with "acts that artificially
curtail life,",7 whereas the termination of life-sustaining treatment and
the refusal of unwanted medical care deal with "acts that artificially
sustain life."79 The court further found that this distinction was
similar to the distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance found in
tort law.8" The court also drew a distinction in that "whereas suicide
involves an affirmative act to end a life, the refusal or cessation of lifesustaining medical treatment simply permits life to run its course,
unencumbered by contrived intervention."8 ' The Michigan Supreme
Court then referenced McKay v. Bergsted 2 and Guardianshipof Jane
Doe83 which also held that there is a difference between suicide and
terminating life-sustaining medical care and refusing unwanted medical
treatment.8 4 With these distinctions, the court found that there was no
fundamental right to commit suicide inherent in the holding of cases
which grant persons the right to terminate life-sustaining treatment or

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77,
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 727.
Id. at 726.
Id. at 727.
Id.
Id. at 733.
Id.
Id. at 728-29.
Id. at 728.
Id.
Id.

81. Id.
82. 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
83. 583 N.E.2d 1263 (Mass. 1992).
84. 527 N.W.2d at 729.
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refuse unwanted medical care.8" The court then addressed the issue of
whether there is a liberty interest in suicide that is found under the
tests developed in Palko and Casey. 6 In Palko, the United States
Supreme Court stated that a right is fundamental if it is implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty or deeply rooted in history and traditions.87
The proponents of assisted suicide argue that this test was expanded in
Casey when the Court, in determining whether a fundamental right
existed, stated that a court must determine whether an "asserted right
to commit suicide arises from a rational evolution of tradition, or
whether recognition of such a right would be a radical departure from
historical precepts."88 In examining whether there is a fundamental
right to suicide, the Michigan Supreme Court examined how society and
courts have dealt with the issue of suicide and assisted suicide.8 9 The
court found that at common law in England, one who committed suicide
was punished by forfeiture of property and an ignomiminious burial.9"
The court also recognized that at the time the Fourteenth Amendment
was ratified, at least twenty-one of the thirty-seven states proscribed
assisted suicide.9 Assisted suicide has also been thought of as being
a breach of the Hippocratic Oath, which states that no one shall
prescribe a deadly drug or give advice that will produce death.92 The
court then looked at present day statutes to determine how states today
deal with the area of suicide. 93 The court found that a "substantial
number of jurisdictions have specific statutes that criminalize assisted
suicide." 94 The court also recognized that a number of states allow the
use of nondeadly force to keep one from committing suicide. 95 Moreover, the court looked to the opinion in Cruzan which read in part, "the
majority of States in this country have laws imposing criminal penalties
on one who assists another to commit suicide. We do not think a State
is required to remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary
decision by a physically able adult to starve to death."98 The Michigan
Supreme Court then went on to hold that the right to commit suicide is

85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id. at 730.
Id.

88. Id.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

730-32.
731.

731-32.
731.
732.
732-33.
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neither implicit in the concept of ordered liberty nor deeply rooted in this
nation's history and tradition. 7 The court found that to declare a
fundamental right to commit suicide would be a radical departure from
existing tradition.9"
Since the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a
statute criminalizing assisted suicide in People v. Kevorkian," other
courts have addressed the issue of assisted suicide. Two days after
Kevorkian was decided, Quill v. Kopell'0 0 was decided by the United
States District Court in New York. The court upheld a statute that
made it a crime to assist another in committing suicide.' 01 The court
reasoned that there is no fundamental right to commit suicide under
prior holdings of the United States Supreme Court, nor can a fundamental right to commit suicide be found within the test described in
Palko.'0 ° The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
the highest federal court that has ruled on whether it is constitutional
to impose criminal penalties on one who assists another in suicide.0 3
In Compassion in Dying v. State of Washington,"' the court of appeals
held that a statute criminalizing assisted suicide is constitutional.0 5
The court noted that no court of final jurisdiction has ever upheld a right
to assisted suicide.0 6 This statement indicates that it is unlikely that
a court of another jurisdiction would find a right to assisted suicide.
Some states have recognized the courts refusal to grant a right to
assisted suicide and have chosen to circumvent the courts by using the
ballot box. In Oregon, Measure 16, The Death With Dignity Act, was
passed by voters on November 8, 1994 and legalized physician-assisted
suicide in some instances.' 7 The Act allows capable adult residents
to make a written request for medication to end their lives.'
The
written request is granted if either the attending and consulting
physicians or a court determine that the patient is terminally ill and has

97. Id. at 733.
98. Id.
99. 527 N.W.2d 714 (Mich. 1994).
100. 870 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), cert. granted,Vacco v. Quill, No. 95-1858 (U.S.
Oct. 1, 1996).
101. 870 F. Supp. at 79.
102. Id. at 84.
103. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted,
Washington v. Blucksberg, No. 95-110 (U.S. Oct. 1, 1996).
104. 49 F.3d at 588.
105. Id. at 590.
106. Id. at 591.
107. Death With Dignity Act, 1995 Or. Laws Ch. 3 (codified at OR. REv. STAT. § 127.800
(Supp. 1996)).
108. Id. § 127.840, § 3.06.
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voluntarily expressed a wish to die.'
Once the Act was passed,
however, the United States District Court for the State of Oregon, in Lee
v. Oregon,"' granted an injunction enjoining Oregon from enforcing
the Act."' The court held that there were serious equal protection and
due process liberty interests to be addressed before the state would be
allowed to enforce the Act.'
The voters of California and Washington
have voted on legislation aimed at legalizing assisted suicide, and in
both states the legislation was defeated'
Recognizing that Oregon
was successful in legalizing assisted suicide through the voters,
Michigan Senate Bill No. 640 was introduced on September 12,
1995," 4 The bill sets forth many criteria that must be met in allowing
assisted suicide in cases where a person makes a written request for
medication to his or her attending physician." ' If the bill is passed by
the voters, it is subject to take effect January 1, 1997.1"6
TERRY BRANTLEY

109. Id. § 127.820, § 3.02.
110. 869 F. Supp. 1491 (D. Oregon 1994).
111. Id. at 1503.
112. Id. at 1498.
113. Proposition 161, defeated in 1992, proposed an amendment to CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 401 (1988); Initiative 119, defeated in 1991, proposed an amendment to WASH. REV.
CODE § 9A.,36.060 (1988).
114. MICH. S. 640, 88th Leg. (1995).

115. Id.
116. Id.

